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Olivia Moskot

Vindicating the Feminism of
Mary Wollstonecraft

B

ritain’s politically radical and passionately
feminist authoress Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) is most often
remembered by contemporary scholars for her works Vindication
of the Rights of Men (1790) and Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792).
Through these pieces, Wollstonecraft comprehensively and earnestly
addresses controversial issues surrounding class and gender in the iconic
voice of rebellion that earned her recognition and fame, even in her own
time. Due to the scope of her social concerns, and because of her unique
method of argumentation, Wollstonecraft is studied today in a variety
of academic disciplines. Her use of Christian reasoning appeals to scholars of religion. Her direct contribution to an ongoing and ever-evolving
feminist movement attracts attention from scholars working in the field
of Women’s Studies. Academics of English literature study her use of language and her conceptualization techniques, and the field of philosophy
is beginning to count Wollstonecraft among the ranks of other important
moral and political philosophers of the early modern era. It is my inclination that Wollstonecraft is well placed in all of the various disciplines
that study her for all of the above-mentioned reasons and more. In recent
conversations surrounding feminist ethics and Wollstonecraft, however,
there has been some pushback. Because of the particular use of religious
terminology in her works, specifically pertaining to virtue, some feminist
ethicists have rejected Wollstonecraft’s ideologies, deeming them to be
incompatible with both second- and third-wave feminism.
As an academic who studies both English literature as well as moral
philosophy, I have come to recognize the deep importance of giving consideration to the form, genre, and circumstances surrounding the production of any given piece. Through a precise understanding of the context of
Wollstonecraft’s works, particularly Vindication of the Rights of Woman, I
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believe that some of the tension that has arisen between Wollstonecraft’s
moral philosophy and modern feminist ethics can be resolved. Emily
Dumler-Winckler’s “Putting On Virtue Without Putting Off Feminists”
is especially helpful in going about this task as, in it, Wollstonecraft’s use
of virtue discourse is thoroughly investigated. Dumler-Winckler parses
through the complicated conditions that influenced Wollstonecraft’s
word choices and proves that the moves Wollstonecraft makes through
her language were not only needful, but also continue to harbor the
potential to empower women to this day. By her article’s conclusion,
Dumler-Winckler leaves her readers with two claims about Wollstonecraft’s philosophies concerning virtue. She argues that for Wollstonecraft,
“it is possible to differentiate between true and false claims regarding virtue and its ascriptions; and that the truth of such claims cannot finally be
determined by an appeal to metaethical theories, or by consensus within
a particular community.” Through these two claims, Dumler-Winckler is
not suggesting that Wollstonecraft believes virtue to be relative; rather,
she asserts that Wollstonecraft does not believe any philosophical theory
or facet of society to be capable of fully encapsulating the true nature
of it. Nor would she trust either to responsibly enforce a universalized
concept of virtue, even if it were attainable by and through them. While I
agree that Dumler-Winckler is likely correct in this case, I do believe that
Wollstonecraft herself was actually constructing an interesting definition
of virtue through her works, perhaps without even being aware that she
was doing so. However, regardless of intention, there is an abundance of
textual evidence in Vindication of the Rights of Woman that Wollstonecraft
does end up defining virtue. In this paper, I will argue that Mary Wollstonecraft defines virtue as the capacity for independence and autonomy.
Furthermore, I will establish that, as Wollstonecraft fights to make at least
some notion of virtue accessible to women as well as men, her philosophies are deeply compatible with second- and even third- wave feminism.
First, it is important to understand from where the tension between
traditional virtue discourse and modern feminist ethics derives. The
Merriam-Webster Book of Word Histories provides contextual information
on the word “virtue,” which reveals that problematic issues of gender
are encapsulated in the very seed of the word. The etymological breakdown of the word is as follows: “[ME vertu, virtu, fr. OF, fr. L virtut-,
virtus strength, manliness, virtue, fr. vir man—more at VIRILE]” (257).
The historical development of the word cradled and carried its inherent
masculinity further: “From their word vir, meaning ‘man’, the Romans
derived the noun virtus to denote the sum of the excellent qualities of
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men, including physical strength, valorous conduct, and moral rectitude”
(256, my emphasis). From there, the word “virtue” drifted into French
and then into English, infecting each person and place it touched with a
gendered perception of “the good.”
Virtue tradition was infectious, and Edmund Burke’s particular conceptualization of virtue (a conservative, traditional understanding), as
seen in his works A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the
Sublime and Beautiful (1757) and Reflections, spread like the virus that it was
from author to politician, from preacher to everyday citizens of England.
It is important to note that many non-fiction works of this time can be
thought of as a form of dialogue rather than as independent stand-alone
pieces. Important literary figures, philosophers, and politicians often
wrote books, pamphlets, and treatises in response to other literary figures’, philosophers’, and politicians’ works. This can be compared to how
contemporary discussions between important figures take place on social
media platforms today. As Burke was a prominent political figure in his
day, Wollstonecraft and many members of her social circle (William Godwin, Thomas Holcroft, Thomas Paine, William Blake, and William Wordsworth) were aware of his writings and took to writing their own pieces
in response. To Reflections, Wollstonecraft directly responded by writing
both sets of Vindications, and Paine directly responded by writing Rights of
Man (1791). It should be noted that, as Burke had done before them, both
Paine and Wollstonecraft used virtue discourse throughout their works.
Additionally, the language in Wollstonecraft’s pieces was influenced by
Burke’s Enquiry—as was the language of the later works of Immanuel
Kant. Dumler-Winckler addresses the shared language between Enquiry
and Vindications, saying, “Rather than rejecting his aesthetic moral philosophy or its most vivid metaphor, the ‘wardrobe of the moral imagination,’
she uses them to undermine the conclusions to which [Burke] thinks his
views naturally point” (347). Wollstonecraft uses a similar tactic in her
approach to virtue discourse. The language of virtue was already present.
It was prominent, it was loud, and it was invasive. And so Wollstonecraft
was left with only a few options: to ignore it, to forget her discourse’s
main concern altogether and focus solely on dismantling virtue tradition,
or to tactfully define virtue toward oblivion.
To define something toward oblivion is to take a word that, by its
very nature, means one thing and to tilt the word’s meaning toward its
original meaning’s opposite until the word collapses in on itself and ceases
to exist. The other possible outcome in successfully nudging a word’s
meaning toward that of its original’s opposite is that the word would
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evolve until it contained its own antonym, which would likely render the
word useless. What does it look like in practice? Simply put, if virtue’s
original core intent was to encapsulate the very best of “manliness” (Merriam-Webster 257) and “to denote the sum of the excellent qualities of men”
(Merriam-Webster 256) but it is tilted by Wollstonecraft toward its opposite (e.g., to encapsulate the very best of womanliness), then the word
collapses. Consider, today, if we started suggesting that the word man
should apply to women also. We would say that “man” in the hospital is
giving birth, or that “man” is buying hygiene products to better care for a
menstrual cycle. In this example, the “men” we are referring to are biologically, socially, and in every other way women. And, if this were the case,
then we could no longer use the word “man” to signal anything. It could
mean man or woman. The word would have been defined into oblivion.
So, for Wollstonecraft to suggest that society must “let [women’s] faculties
have room to unfold, and their virtues [or manliness] to gain strength”
(125), she is pushing the word against itself. This is because Wollstonecraft
was disinterested in perpetuating the gendered realities of the term, but
rather in encouraging the pursuit of the scaffolding system that had lain
beneath. Rather than trying to encourage readers to embody “the excellent qualities of men,” she was interested in encouraging all readers, male
and female, to embody excellent qualities, period. But, if one kills off the
core of virtue, which is manliness, what is left of the concept to maintain?
This question is best answered through an analysis of Wollstonecraft’s
own text.
First, it is imperative that readers understand that Vindication of the
Rights of Woman is centered around Wollstonecraft’s call for society to
“let [women’s] faculties have room to unfold, and their virtues to gain
strength” (125). She also shifts the meaning of virtue away from gender
when she responds to an unknown writer who “declared that it is masculine for a woman to be melancholy” and suggests that this man must
believe woman “to be the toy of man, his rattle . . . [that] must jingle in his
ears whenever, dismissing reason, he chooses to be amused” (124). In saying this, Wollstonecraft gives woman permission to have and to exercise a
full range of emotions. Virtue, therefore, seems to be tied to humanhood,
and humanhood to independence. The unknown writer Wollstonecraft is
pushing against in this passage is suggesting that serious, rational feelings
are reserved for men alone, and this indicates that he assumes that virtue
(or manliness) and rationality are tied to one another. He then excludes
women from rationality, and (as Wollstonecraft suggests) implies that
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uation, of feeling the realities of the world, while women exist only to
distract from these realities. But, if the man in this situation were to suddenly cease existing, of what use would his smiling, unfeeling woman be?
The answer is that she would not have any purpose. A person who exists
only to bring distraction and enjoyment to another is not a person at all,
but a plaything. For most thinkers, both then and now, virtue is reserved
for those who are fully human. Wollstonecraft maintains that to be fully
human and not merely an accessory, one must be allowed to experience
rational, serious feelings as well as lighthearted and frivolous feelings.
Therefore, in order to extend virtue to women, Wollstonecraft extends
rationality and, by extension, personhood to her as well. By extending
rationality to women, Wollstonecraft is extending full humanhood to
women and is freeing them from their role as secondary beings. Granting
women virtue is, therefore, less about the extension of rationality and
more about the extension of full humanity—a status of independence. The
ultimate benefit that comes as a result of a woman receiving permission
from society to access rationality is not that she can then feel melancholy,
but that she is being allowed to experience full humanhood as an independent, autonomous being.
Wollstonecraft continues to tie virtue to independence and autonomy
as she asserts that the ungendered bare-bones of virtue serve to dignify all
humans (122). She states that “weakness may excite tenderness, and gratify
the arrogant pride of man; but the lordly caresses of a protector will not
gratify a noble mind that pants for, and deserves to be respected. Fondness is a poor substitute for friendship” (122). Because virtue and dignity
are connected, that which would detract from a woman’s dignity is to
be discouraged and that which excites respect is to be encouraged. Most
individuals enjoy flatteries and care, but being the constant recipient and
never the instigator of these things, again denies an individual his or her
opportunity to have a full experience. Humanhood is about both receiving and showing kindness. It is about complementing as well as being
complimented, it is a give and take. But when one sex is excluded from
the active parts of these exchanges, she falls out of humanhood. For, if a
woman is to only ever experience and deliver tenderness and is never to
have or know power or force, then how is she to have a proper exchange
concerning the moral complexities surrounding each? And how is man
to form relationships with one who does not know the realities of both?
Here, Wollstonecraft’s philosophies imply that a patriarchal understanding of virtue hurts men as well as women. For if a man has put a woman
in a position that she can only ever be secondary to him and never fully
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human, then how is he to be anything more than fond of her? He has
lost the potential for friendship with fifty percent of the population.
And because he has refused to afford respect and dignity to the person
to whom he is to be most connected to in the world—his spouse—he is
doomed to feel a loneliness that did not have to be his. Clearly, the gendered definition of virtue does not only result in loss for women but for
men as well. In her discourse on virtue in relation to female dignity and
respect, Wollstonecraft does not only appeal to men (and society in general) to discontinue their oppression of women, but she appeals directly
to women as well. To those who share her sex, Wollstonecraft says:
I earnestly wish to point out in what true dignity and human
happiness consists—I wish to persuade women to endeavour to
acquire strength, both of mind and body, and to convince them
that the soft phrases, susceptibility of heart, delicacy of sentiment,
and refinement of taste, are almost synonymous with epithets of
weakness. (114)
Through this passage, Wollstonecraft encourages women to acquire
strength and to avoid that which would render them weak. Strength is
a foundational part of traditional virtue discourse— one which many
women are sensitive to because women have classically been seen as
physically weaker than men, and this weakness has been used by even
some of the fairest philosophers to downgrade women in terms of equality. Wollstonecraft’s encouragement for women to acquire strength and
to avoid weakness, however, is hardly rooted in some fruitless attempt
to make all women physically stronger than all men in order to refute
that particular argument. No, strength seems to be tied to virtue for
Wollstonecraft for other reasons. To understand these reasons, readers
need to refer to the passage that comes directly before: “My own sex, I
hope, will excuse me, if I treat them like rational creatures, instead of
flattering their fascinating graces, and viewing them as if they were in a
state of perpetual childhood, unable to stand alone” (114). This section is
often skimmed over or cast as a funny, insignificant aside, but the philosophies within it actually help readers. They help readers to understand
Wollstonecraft’s motivations for maintaining the importance of strength
even with its history of male-exaggerated praise.
First, she brings up the idea that women are often trapped “in a state
of perpetual childhood” (pg 114). What would the consequences be of a
state such as this? The consequences are vast and could fill pages and pages
of a philosophical journal, but I wish to focus on those that feel most
obvious. First, perpetual childhood means a denial of rationality. Second,
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it means never gaining emotional maturity or the ability to fully grasp
complex feelings. Third, it means forever being denied political and social
influence. And, as Wollstonecraft points out most directly, it means not
being able to ever “stand alone,” or be independent and autonomous. As
this passage is directed toward women, it seems that Wollstonecraft is
not encouraging that women rally physical and mental strength to take
on men, but, rather, to take on their own selves. The conversation is not
meant to invite physical fights between men and women over woman’s
right to fully develop, but to invite women to partake in personal development regardless of where their societies currently stand on the propriety of it. Wollstonecraft is inviting women to grow as individuals and to
claim their autonomy, rather than allow themselves to be pacified.
In conclusion, the philosophies of Mary Wollstonecraft are hardly at
odds with those of prominent feminist ethicists of today—especially not
on the grounds of her participation in virtue discourse. On the contrary,
Wollstonecraft’s philosophies attempt to close gaps that existed in her
time, and that still exist today, between the concepts of man, woman,
and humanhood. She takes part in a literary project of dismantling the
limiting gender components of virtue through the art of redefinition and
constructs a version of virtue that concerns itself with humanhood rather
than manliness. She speaks to second-wave feminism by inviting women
to become more independent and autonomous, and to third-wave feminism by inviting men to consider friendship and true connectedness with
women.
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